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I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
1
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

I take as a point of departure Akhil Amar’s general description of the
Sixth Amendment and his typology.2 He aptly describes the Sixth Amendment
as the “heartland of constitutional criminal procedure.”3 In this symposium, we
discussed the right of confrontation and aspects of the right to counsel. Amar
located those rights within the “fair trial cluster” of Sixth Amendment rights.4
He linked the rights of confrontation and counsel together with compulsory
process, and he characterized them as the “great engines by which an innocent
man can make the truth of his innocence visible to the jury and the public.”5
Amar’s final statement focused on the importance of these combined
rights in the presentation of evidence at the showpiece of the criminal justice
system—the contested criminal trial.6 Here, the defendant, aided by counsel,
can demonstrate his innocence.7 I am attracted to the image of the full
enjoyment of these rights coming together where the decision on guilt or
innocence is made. The simplest and the purest enjoyment of the right to
counsel occurs in the adversarial trial with an experienced and adequately
resourced defense attorney cross-examining prosecution witnesses and
presenting the defendant’s case.8 I much prefer the idea of ensuring
confrontation rights at trial by making avoidance difficult, which prompts the
prosecution to find, prepare, and present the witnesses, rather than the “get out

1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 641 (1996).
3. Id. I take issue with many of Amar’s most basic conclusions, but not with the framework he sets.
4. Id. at 642. Amar finds the amendment to have three clusters of rights: the first concerns speedy
trial, the second a public trial, and the third a fair trial. Id. at 642-43. The fair trial rights encompass
notice and the opportunity to hear and be heard. Put slightly differently, this last cluster
safeguards the right to know, and defend oneself against, an accusation of criminal wrongdoing.
Textually, this cluster encompasses the rights to (a) be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation; (b) be confronted with prosecution witnesses; (c) compel the production of defense
witnesses; and (d) enjoy the assistance of counsel in defending against the accusation.
Id. at 642.
5. Id. at 643.
6. See id. at 705-10.
7. Id. at 708.
8. See id. at 706.
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of jail free” result for the defendant when the confrontation right is violated and
critical hearsay statements are excluded.9
There are two major practical problems with Amar’s concept, however,
and one conceptual one.10 The two practical problems go a long way toward
destroying an idealized view of the Sixth Amendment rights that come together
in the adversarial defense.11 In discussions about this Symposium, Andy
Taslitz suggested to me that in his view, the adversarial defense is dead, dying,
or at least badly injured.12 He somewhat overstated the point, but the larger
trends in the criminal justice system give some reality to the trend he
suggested.13
What are the problems? The first is with counsel.14 Clearly, that right is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as interpreted initially by Gideon v.
Wainwright and expanded most recently by Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v.
Frye.15 As a practical matter largely driven by resource limitations, however,
the right, in a sense of effective assistance, does not exist for many defendants,
even those charged with serious criminal cases.16 The second is with the trial.17
Again, the guarantee is theoretically clear, but we simply do not have many
trials anymore.18 Scholars and commentators have noted this trend for a
number of years, and now the Supreme Court in Lafler has made it official:
“[T]he reality [is] that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of
pleas, not a system of trials.”19
The conceptual problem is with showing that a defendant is innocent
through a criminal trial. As we now conceive actual innocence—a conclusive
showing that the defendant did not commit the crime—it will almost never be
proven at trial.20 If clear innocence is established with scientific proof or
something of similar certainty, such as digital trace evidence, that proof is
9. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC’Y, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 12
(1988) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS] (stating that prosecutors have adjusted their practices as a
result of the exclusionary rule).
10. See Amar, supra note 2, at 705-10.
11. See id.
12. See generally Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the Adversary System:
The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 948-49 (2008) (arguing
that a lack of reform for indigent defense has led to a broken and unreliable criminal justice system).
13. See id. at 947-48.
14. See id.
15. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
16. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 16 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE]
(stating that lack of funding and resources is a major cause of the indigent counsel crisis).
17. See id.
18. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 9, at 41 (claiming that underfunding has led to
negotiated dispositions supplanting trials, resulting in “‘bargain-basement’ justice”).
19. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1381.
20. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1669-70 (2008)
(stating that current inconsistent criminal procedure rules hinder access to DNA evidence at trial, which is the
most probative exculpatory evidence of innocence).
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typically produced either before or after trial. 21 The best we get at trial is that
the defendant may not have committed the crime—the acquittal occurring
because there is some level of doubt.22 Given the high percentages of
defendants who are guilty, we do not know whether an acquittal was a victory
or a defeat for justice, which makes it difficult to celebrate as a triumph of both
accuracy and procedural fairness.23 The uncertainty about innocence when the
typical acquittal occurs leads to a secondary set of issues regarding the meaning
of fairness and its link in Amar’s quotation to innocence, in particular, and,
more generally, accuracy of results.24 Obviously, a tension exists between
guarantees of procedural fairness provided to all those charged with a crime and
a focus on accuracy and the subset of accuracy that gets the most modern
attention—innocence.25
The reality in the American criminal justice system is the inadequacy of
the provision of counsel in far too many cases and the paucity of criminal
trials.26 The prevalence of under-resourcing and massive caseloads for defense
counsel means that many are, in any practical sense of the word, ineffective
regardless of how well-intentioned and vigorous they are.27 Neither the
inadequate provision of resources to the defense nor the relative infrequency of
trials is likely to change for the better any time soon. These are persistent
trends, and if anything, they are likely to get worse as the need for long-run
deficit reduction systemically restricts the resources available to state and local
governments for the myriad of important tasks where pressing needs exist.28 In
this context, it is difficult to imagine how indigent defense receives more than
minimal funding because it competes against far more politically popular
programs that are indeed major societal needs, such as education, roads, and
healthcare.29
21. See Robert P. Mosteller, Evidence History and Rumblings in the Future of Proof, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 523, 532-37 (2006) (describing new and expanding types of “trace” evidence such as automated
recording cameras and tracking devices that provide the potential to prove locations of individuals with high
degrees of certainty much earlier than trace evidence, such as fingerprints, did in earlier eras and can in larger
percentages of cases than in the past prove guilt or innocence).
22. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 (1978).
23. See id. (noting that, in some cases, an acquittal is not an accurate determination of innocence).
24. See supra note 5.
25. See Garrett, supra note 20, at 1669-70 (stating that the current failure of the states or federal courts
to adopt a straightforward right to preserve and present evidence of innocence contrasts criminal procedure of
an earlier era).
26. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 16.
27. See id. at 16-17.
28. Id. at 11.
29. See Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 121-22 [hereinafter Dripps, Up
from Gideon]. Somewhat ironically, while disadvantaging defendants generally, including the innocent, who
rely on underfunded indigent defense services limited funding, see infra Part II.B, limited state and
particularly local funding may help those accused of the most serious crimes who are being prosecuted for
their lives. See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV.
227, 275-78 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty] (noting that in most states
counties pay for capital prosecutions and have reasons to avoid costly death penalty prosecutions that may not
reflect the local electorate’s priorities).
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The Sixth Amendment also confronts a problem with the scope of the
right to counsel pretrial, which is also analyzed in this Symposium.30 The
demand that statements not be elicited from defendants represented by counsel
has an exclusionary element that gives the guarantee its teeth.31 Indeed, the
right to counsel at trial may be practically meaningless if guilt has effectively
been established against the defendant through conversations with him by
government agents before trial without the aid of counsel.32
II. FREQUENTLY IGNORED FEATURES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LANDSCAPE THAT SHAPE OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT, REFORM,
AND EFFICIENCY
A. The Cumulative Predominance of the State Criminal Justice Systems
Despite Academic Preoccupation with Proceedings in the Federal System
I find that most academic criminal procedure discussions focus principally
on the federal criminal justice system and largely ignore the states. Of course,
the decisions of the federal courts with regard to constitutional rights are
preeminent.33 The emphasis on federal constitutional cases is not the focus of
my criticism.34 It is as if the American criminal justice system is the relatively
well-resourced federal system, which is also characterized by an integrated and
hierarchical prosecutorial structure.35 In fact, the vast majority of serious
criminal prosecutions are handled in the much more chaotic and underfunded
state courts.36 Although federal criminal law enforcement is expanding,
criminal justice remains the predominant responsibility of states and localities,
rather than the federal criminal system.37 As measured by those incarcerated,
87.5% of inmates are confined in state prisons, and thus, 12.5%—or slightly
more than 10%—are confined in the federal system.38
30. See infra Part V.B.
31. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
32. But see Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 593 (2009) (allowing impeachment using a statement
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because “the accused continues to enjoy the
assistance of counsel; the assistance is simply not worth much”).
33. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
34. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
35. See Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
739, 742 n.14 [hereinafter Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent].
36. See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 1015
(2009).
37. See Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2008—Statistical Tables,
BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 tbl.2 (Mar. 2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf
/pim08st.pdf. From the end of 2000 through mid-year 2008, federal prison population grew faster than state
prison population in general, moving from 10.5% of the total to 12.5%, and the federal system passing both
those of Texas and California to house the largest prison population at the end of the period. Id. In terms of
all inmates held in state or federal prisons of local jails, the increase was from 7.2% to 8.6%. Id. at 16 tbl.15.
38. Id. at 3 tbl.2 (reporting that the total federal and state prison population was 1,601,584 and the
federal prison population was 201,142). When those housed in jails, which are typically the responsibility of
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My perception is that most legal scholars who practiced criminal law
before entering academia practiced in the federal system. I spent my seven
years in practice at the Washington, D.C. Public Defender Service (PDS). PDS
practiced principally, not in federal district court, but in superior court.39 This
was essentially like many metropolitan courts in a state court system, a court
filled with a mass of humanity and an enormous number of cases.40 But the
prosecutors were Assistant United States Attorneys, and critically, PDS had
nearly the resources of a federal defender office with, for example, its own
budget line item for expert services.41
Defense resources are the key. In federal defender offices, heavy, but not
unreasonable, caseloads and overall resources, in fact, permit conscientious
counsel to practice effectively.42 For wealthy defendants who can hire their
own counsel, for federal cases generally, and occasionally in other settings, the
right to counsel is meaningful, but in far too many other situations, counsel are
inadequately resourced and overburdened.43 Indeed, in many states, resources
are woefully inadequate.44 This situation has existed for decades, and if
anything, the situation is likely getting worse rather than better with the
prospect of limited funds for state and local governments into the foreseeable
future.45
B. The Limited Adequacy, Often the General Inadequacy, of Counsel for
Indigent Defendants in State Criminal Justice Systems
With over 80% of those charged with felonies being indigent, most
defendants do not have the financial resources to retain their own lawyer.46 In
addition, many of those determined not to be indigent under the varying
standards used are of modest means and frequently receive marginal
representation with, for example, little or no investigation to develop evidence
to challenge the factual picture presented by the prosecution.47

localities rather than the states, are also included, the state and local percentage increases to 91.3%, and the
federal percentage dips below the 10% level. Id. at 3 tbl.2, 16 tbl.15 (reporting that the total held in federal or
state prisons or local jails was 2,310,984 and those in federal custody was 201,142, the federal prison
population being 198,402).
39. See generally PUB. DEFENDER SERVICE FOR D.C., http://www.pdsdc.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2012)
(describing PDS).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Inga L. Parsons, “Making It a Federal Case”: A Model for Indigent Representation, 1997 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 837, 840 (describing her good fortune to work as a public defender “in the federal system where
the culture of lawyering was based on traditional notions of adversarial advocacy and manageable caseloads”).
43. See Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 35, at 744-48.
44. Id. at 754.
45. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 11.
46. See Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 35, at 748.
47. See id. at 748, 781.
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We celebrate the Gideon decision, which grants the right to appointed
counsel.48 As Professor Darryl Brown states, however, almost fifty years now
after Gideon, the “political limit on defense counsel [underfunding] is a fixed
component of criminal justice; underfunding of defense will not change except
at the margins.”49 Underfunded lawyers faced with excessive caseloads of
necessity engage in a severe triage process, with many having minimal contact
with their client and little or no independent investigation before their clients
become part of the great majority who are presented with the prosecution’s plea
offer and, on advice of their counsel or from despair, accept it.50
Many have noted these and similar problems as a backdrop to their
discussion of the serious inadequacy of funding for state defenders.51 Over the
last thirty years, the American Bar Association (ABA) has prepared a number
of major reports on indigent funding, which reveal essentially the same
fundamental funding inadequacies in the vast majority of states.52 In 1982, the
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, after an analysis of
funding in forty states, summarized the state of representation as follows:
“Overall, there is abundant evidence in this report that defense services for the
poor are inadequately funded. As a result, millions of persons . . . who have a

48. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (holding that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, state courts are required in criminal cases to provide counsel for indigent defendants).
49. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005) (making this assertion and linking it to the legislative
decision to limit defense counsel’s effectiveness because of representation of guilty clients’ interests and lack
of focus on accuracy in adjudication); see also Dripps, Up from Gideon, supra note 29, at 121-22. Brown
argues that although
[r]ight-to-counsel (and later, effective-assistance) cases repeatedly described defense lawyers as
improving the accuracy of adjudication, defense counsel’s commitment is not to accuracy; it is to
his or her clients, many of whom want inaccuracy to mask their guilt. Legislatures recognize this
difference, and they have responded to Court mandates for defense counsel by consistently
underfunding defenders in order to constrain their effectiveness.
Brown, supra, at 1590. Whether Brown has accurately identified the causal mechanism, it is clear he has
captured the reality of the result. See id.
50. See Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?,
75 MO. L. REV. 683, 691 (2010) (describing the inadequate representation in many courtrooms where lawyers
meet their incarcerated clients in the courtroom en masse and discuss for a brief time with them the terms of
the plea offer and negotiated sentence, with wavier of rights and a guilty plea entered shortly thereafter in a
“meet ‘em and plead ‘em” process).
51. See Randy Uphoff, Broke and Broken: Can We Fix Our State Indigent Defense System?, 75 MO. L.
REV. 667, 667-68 (2010) (cataloging, in the foreword to a symposium on the failures of state indigent defense
system, a large number of national reports, individual state studies, and articles on the frequent failure of state
indigent defense systems to provide adequate representation); see also, e.g., Backus, supra note 12, at 952-61
(characterizing state indigent defense systems as continually underfunded); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus,
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (noting that
“in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is drastically
underfinanced”); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to
the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 800-08 (describing individual
injustices resulting from inadequate representation); Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent, supra note 35, at 74879 (same).
52. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.

8

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1

constitutional right to counsel are denied effective legal representation.”53 In
2004, the ABA report found that “[t]oo often when attorneys are provided,
crushing workloads make it impossible for them to devote sufficient time to
their cases, leading to widespread breaches of professional obligations.”54 In
2011, Professor Norman Lefstein, who has been at the center of the ABA’s
study process, authored a book that cited two additional national studies
completed in 2009, which delivered this same message: “[T]hose who furnish
public defense services across the country have far too many cases, and this
reality impacts the quality of their representation, often severely eroding the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel.”55
The United States Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he very premise of
our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides
of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty [will] be
convicted and the innocent go free.”56 The failure of states and localities to
fund indigent defense adequately removes an essential ingredient of the
adversary system—the existence of an effective opponent to the prosecution.57
Indeed, it alters the basic character of American justice from its essential
adversarial design.
This failure to provide adequately paid and supported defense advocates
is, in my judgment, the most serious challenge to justice in the United States.
Most procedural protections granted in landmark Supreme Court opinions
require the assistance of a lawyer for effective enforcement.58 “[Many]
defenses can be independently recognized and accepted by prosecutors, but
most cases proceed to the charging stage because of the apparent guilt of the
defendant and the complexity of the defense or the ambiguity of the facts.”59
This difficult environment requires skilled development of the evidence and the
ability and resources to bring them before either the prosecutor or the jury in an
53. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, CRIMINAL
DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION
AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING 2 (1982); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 9, at
35, 37 (noting in a shorter report prepared six years later a similar conclusion that “defense representation . . .
is too often inadequate” because “we, as a society, [are] depriving the system of the funds necessary to ensure
adequate defense services”).
54. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that “[t]o make matters worse, exceedingly
modest compensation deters private attorneys from performing more than the bare minimum required for
payment” and that “the structure of indigent defense systems often means that judges and/or state and county
officials control the attorneys, thereby denying them the professional independence afforded to their
prosecution counterparts and to their colleagues retained by paying clients”).
55. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, CRIMINAL
SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 12 (2011).
56. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
57. See Backus & Marcus, supra note 51, at 1036 (emphasizing the need for competent defense
attorneys to protect the innocent from conviction).
58. Backus, supra note 12, at 946.
59. Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and
Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design of Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 319, 328 (2011) [hereinafter Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System].
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understandable and persuasive form.60 Without adequate assistance of counsel
and supporting services, much of what our system prizes in terms of rights,
fairness, and accuracy simply has no chance to be achieved.61
If I am correct, why is this effective denial of counsel not among the most
prominent issues in criminal justice circles and in academic literature? One
reason may be that to protest the situation is the equivalent of “tilting at
windmills.” The situation will not change, and it is hard to see the significance
of developing or pushing reforms if there is no effective chance they will be
implemented. I suspect that another reason underfunding has not received the
degree of attention deserved is that the federal system, where academic
attention is centered, generally provides much better funding.62 We should
focus on the actual provision of counsel that exists within our operating
criminal justice systems, not the assumption that provision of counsel in the
federal “mansion house” is the norm.
C. The Limited Percentages of Criminal Cases that Go to Trial
Gross data hide nuance and indeed can distort basic reality.63 The increase
in percentage of cases ending in guilty pleas, however, is unmistakable.64 It
ballooned over the last twenty-five years.65 In Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme
Court gave us its summary: “Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and
60. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (stating that effective assistance requires
the defense to subject the state’s case to “reliable adversarial testing”).
61. See id. at 685. I am among those who see the right to counsel as the most important right to ensure a
fair trial and to protect the innocent. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case
for an Ex Ante Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997) [hereinafter Dripps, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel] (“It is indeed the case that effective defense representation is the single most important
of our system's safeguards against convicting people of crimes they had nothing to do with or of more serious
offenses than they actually committed. And it is indeed the case that there is no prospect of legislative action
to improve the situation.”).
62. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 16, at 8 (listing the funding of indigent defense by
state); see also Ron Gottlieb et al., Federal Assistance to State and Local Indigent Defense Programs FY
1998 and 1999, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N (1998-1999), available at http://www.nlada.org/
DMS/ Documents/1013119600.02/Federal%20Assistance%20Report%20FY98-99.pdf (outlining indigent
defense funding assistance available to the states). Even this relatively generous funding in comparison to
other indigent support is for many lawyers below their ordinary market rate. See Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV.
869, 881 & n.55 (2009) (citing effort to increase pay rates for appointed attorneys in the federal system
because the existing rate does not even offset overhead costs). I suspect that in combination the general
adequacy of funding for both the defense and prosecutorial functions in the federal court system, the
predominate experience of legal academics in that system, and the primacy of federal developments in
published work produces a failure to recognize the important inadequacies of state court defense
representation. My sense is that most academics at national law schools interested in criminal justice issues
are not aware of inadequacies in the indigent defense systems operating in their state criminal courts.
63. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 79, 88-89 (2005) [hereinafter Wright, Trial Distortion].
64. Id. at 90.
65. See id. (detailing the increase of guilty pleas in federal trials and noting a similar result in state cases
without providing the detailed progression).
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ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas,” and as I
noted earlier, announced that “ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials.’”66
According to data presented by Professor Ron Wright, the number of
federal cases rose from an average of 46,202 in the decade from 1980 to 1989
to an average of 76,519 for the period 2000 to 2002.67 In 1981, the percentage
of federal adjudicated cases that ended in a guilty plea was 77%, but by 2002,
the percentage was 95.2%.68 The figures not only reveal a percentage drop in
trials but also show a substantial absolute reduction in the number of trials.69
Professor Wright estimated that if the trial rate was the same in 2002, the most
recent year for which he had data, as in 1980, when the rate began its steady
rise, the total number of federal trials and the costs associated with them would
rise almost ten-fold.70
Professor Wright suggested that distortions are just as important in state
courts as in federal courts based on gross characteristics of the state court
caseload and resources.71 Perhaps outweighing potentially larger penalties for
trials in federal courts, jury trials typically get higher priority in lower volume
courts dealing with more serious crimes, which is the relative nature of federal
caseloads compared to those in state courts.72 Pleas in such state settings are
often resolved based on limited conversation between attorneys because the
“going rate” for a plea in each crime with a defendant having a certain criminal
record is well-established.73
Neither the percentage of cases going to trial in criminal cases nor their
numbers are likely to increase in future years.74 The resource-scarcity problem
caused by budget cutbacks at the state court level is creating a crisis of access to
justice for civil litigants.75 Imagining that expanded resources are going to be
66. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388
(2012)).
67. Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note 63, at 89.
68. Id. at 91 fig.1. Data from 2009 reveals the same basic high rate of pleas—95.3%—as in 2002. Mark
Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics 2009—Statistical Tables, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS 12 tbl.10 (Dec.
2011), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09st.pdf (showing 81,894 guilty pleas and trials, with
78,042 of them guilty pleas (95.3%) and 3,850 trials (4.7%)).
69. Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note 63, at 91.
70. Id. Professor Wright argues that the increase in guilty plea rates was most likely the result of
“prosecutorial . . . techniques that distorted trial outcomes” and particularly federal sentencing law that gave
prosecutors and judges the ability to impose “ever larger and more certain penalty on defendants who go to
trial.” Id. at 116-17.
71. See id. at 154.
72. See id.
73. Id. Even at the felony level, the rough percentage of cases going to trial in the states is much the
same as in the federal courts, with fewer than 6% of felony cases going to trial in 2004. Matthew R. Durose
& Patrick A. Langan, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (July 2007),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf.
74. See Wright, Trial Distortion, supra note 63, at 90 (noting the consistently high rate of guilty pleas in
recent years).
75. Edwin Meese III & William T. Robinson, Our Liberty Depends on Funding Our Courts So They
Can Protect All of Us, FOX NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/01/16/our-liberty-
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available to the criminal justice system to support trials with the unmet needs of
the general public reaching crisis levels is unrealistic. Professor Stephanos
Bibas has argued that the reality is that, contrary to the view of most criminal
procedure scholars, the trial is not “the center of the universe,” and rational
suspects should not focus on maximizing their chance of success at trial.76
Most sorting and effectively adjudicating is done by prosecutors rather than
judges or juries.77 Indeed, protection of clear innocence may more likely occur
pretrial than at any other stage.78
III. THE ATTRACTION OF PROCEDURES THAT ENHANCE THE PROTECTION
OF THE INNOCENT
A. Innocence as an Enabler to Progressive Reform
Much of the discussion of criminal procedure reforms today
understandably takes place against a backdrop of concern for protecting the
innocent.79 Exonerations, led by DNA exonerations, have greatly increased
interest in reforms that promise protection for the innocent.80 As noted earlier, I
spent seven years as a defense attorney PDS in Washington, D.C. For a public
defender who is obligated to defend whomever he or she is assigned to
represent and whose role is generally conceptualized as caring about equal
treatment under the law, giving special attention to an apparently innocent
client is not easily accommodated;81 nevertheless, the prospect of innocence
depends-on-funding-our-courts-so-can-protect-all-us/; Sam Favate, Shrinking State Court Budgets: Not Just a
New York Thing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/01/26shrinkingstate-court-budgets-not-just-a-new-york-thing/. The reduction in civil trials, particularly civil jury trials, is just
as dramatic. See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
165, 172 (2006) (“[T]he civil jury has for all practical purposes disappeared. . . .”).
76. See Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421, 42324 (2003).
77. See Barkow, supra note 62, at 871 (arguing that in a system where only one in twenty cases goes to
trial, prosecutors are not only law enforcers but also the de facto final adjudicators of nearly all cases);
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.
J. 1, 45-46 (1997) (arguing that defendants, whether guilty or innocent have their best opportunity for a
favorable outcome through the judgments of prosecutors who “sort” far more defendants than judges or
juries).
78. See Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV. 139,
151-53 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection] (arguing that the trial
has been displaced as the main event when it comes to innocence protection with more of the protection
occurring pretrial and yet other instances of protection, particularly with the advent of some definitive
scientific testing methods, such as DNA, to post-trial).
79. See id. at 147-48.
80. See id. at 143-44.
81. See Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 509 n.100 (2000). In describing
the procedure guarantees in the Sixth Amendment to a trial and to a jury trial, Justice Scalia in Crawford v.
Washington proceeded from an argument that the right could obviously not be eliminated simply because a
judge believed it clear either that the defendant was guilty as to the right to a trial or that the hearsay was
trustworthy as to the confrontation right. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004); quoted
language in text accompanying infra note 191. Obviously, if a judge cannot dispense with a trial because of
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almost inevitably holds special power.82 Even more critically, concerns about
innocence hold special attraction for critical groups for any successful reform
effort—the public, legislatures, and judges.83 Innocence acts as an enabler for
progressive positions that otherwise would attract little attention.84
Unfortunately, the way innocence is often presented by those supporting
exoneration or legal relief, and those who are skeptical, can distort the
substance of otherwise sound proposals.85
B. A Narrow Focus on Proof of Certain Innocence
Professor Rob Smith argues that innocence is likely most often addressed
today pretrial and post-trial, omitting the trial as the focus of concern.86 I
believe he is correct under his definition of innocence, which is definitive—or
almost definitive—proof of innocence.87 Except in extremely unusual
situations, prosecutors willingly dismiss cases when they are provided with
clear evidence of innocence.88 Thus, I take little issue with Professor Smith’s
point that definitive proof of innocence rarely occurs at trial.89 I do contest his
contention that innocence is protected at trial in only a limited number of cases,
a conclusion that I believe flows from the restrictive definition of innocence
often used today.90 That is innocence definitively established or almost
definitively established through irrefutable proof.91 The high bar for finding
actual innocence is an understandable general perspective given the appropriate
skepticism of self-serving innocence claims and particularly when, as Smith is
doing, the focus is developing a post-conviction model for exoneration, which
institutionally must require strong proof to overcome important interests in
finality.92

her belief of the defendant’s guilt, defense counsel cannot cease to act as counsel guaranteed as another
procedural right under the Constitution because she believes the client to be guilty.
82. For an effort to address this difficult balancing act, see Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys
Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 54-56 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller,
Defense Attorneys].
83. See id. at 4-5.
84. See id. at 2.
85. See id.
86. See Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, supra note 78, at 153.
87. See id. at 203-04.
88. See Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for
Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 933-34 (2010) [hereinafter Mosteller,
Protecting the Innocent].
89. See Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, supra note 78, at 153.
90. See id. at 143.
91. I am not here suggesting the broader concept that includes constitutional errors in addition to
“actual” innocence within the term innocence. See Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1083, 1089-90 (2011). I am instead highlighting that innocence can be actual but can remain unproveable.
92. See Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, supra note 78, at 141.

2012]

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FAIRNESS

13

For many defendants, proving innocence is not possible because no
definitive evidence of innocence exists.93 Rather, this class of innocent
defendants are mixed among and hidden within a larger group that includes
many guilty defendants as well.94 For the entire group, the evidence of guilt is
relatively weak, and if an acquittal results, it is because the jury had a
reasonable doubt.95 I believe that in overall numbers, when compared to
definitive proof of innocence, quite a large number of the truly innocent who
are charged with a crime are contained in this group of reasonable doubt
acquittals. Defendants in these cases can be identified as solid candidates for
acquittal on the grounds of reasonable doubt, but they are typically not
exonerated and rarely celebrated for having been proved actually innocent.96
Definitively establishing innocence is particularly difficult when the defendant
is innocent of the particular crime but not a stranger to crime.97
Despite the decline in the number of trials, I believe the trial continues to
be a key place where innocence is protected. The limited number of acquittals
surely far outstrips the number of defendants found clearly actually innocent
post-trial. Nevertheless, the place of the trial in our system is declining, and in
much of the rest of this paper, I put emphasis on administrative remedies.98
One reason is that while trial acquittals may hold a special place for innocence
protection, an acquittal without exoneration will rarely be publicly celebrated.99
To outside observers, unlike scientific proof of innocence, the result will appear
to be just as likely a denial of justice in the acquittal of a guilty defendant as it
would be the protection of an innocent defendant.100
Nevertheless, the reality is that trials are available only for a small number
of defendants.101 I draw two conclusions. First, if one cares about the rights
protected by the Sixth Amendment, reliance on protection of those rights at the
trial proceeding will fail to reach most defendants.102 A focus on trial rights is
appropriate and improvements there are important, but it should be part of a
broader systemic approach that includes investigative and sorting processes that
occur both before and after the criminal trial.103 Second, procedures that make
an acquittal more likely are valuable and in fact are critical to protecting the
innocent, but they will not necessarily draw public attention.104 This is one
93. See Mosteller, Defense Attorneys, supra note 82, at 3-4.
94. See id. at 9-11.
95. See id. at 35-36.
96. See Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 88, at 977-80.
97. See Mosteller, Defense Attorneys, supra note 82, at 41-43.
98. See infra Part IV.
99. See Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 88, at 977-80.
100. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
101. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 9, at 40-41 (discussing the underfunding of appointed
counsel and its connection with frequency of plea bargaining).
102. See id.
103. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1358-61 (1997).
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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reason that support for more robust funding for criminal defense efforts will
likely gain only modest support from the successes of the innocence movement.
Improvement in overall procedures that, particularly before the trial, help sort
the likely guilty from the likely innocent and provide greater fairness generally
are, I suspect, the place where the most significant improvements can be made,
and that is where I turn next.
IV. A GENERAL APPROACH: FAIRNESS, PRAGMATISM, AND
EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE DESIGN
As reflected in my title, my approach is to treat the Sixth Amendment
rights of counsel and confrontation as part of the guarantee to a fair trial and try
to develop reforms built around the principles of fairness, pragmatism, and
effectiveness. I do not propose any new definition or expansion of rights.
Indeed, I question whether any “discovery” of a new core meaning to the right
to counsel, for instance, more than two hundred years after the framing of the
Constitution, could be powerful enough to produce the massive outlays of funds
needed to fund indigent defenders throughout our dispersed criminal justice
system. We can, however, take important steps, principally through sets of
changes at the administrative and operational level, to improve the base level of
representation and the quality of justice.105
Protocol for securing eyewitness identifications by the police provides a
model for administrative reforms of the type I suggest. Scholars have long
criticized the weakness of the constitutional doctrines governing suggestive
eyewitness identifications.106 That issue could be addressed by securing experts
to testify about the weaknesses of the identification procedures in the individual
case, which remains potentially available as an option.107 I suggest, however,
the use of such experts will be of limited effectiveness because of the expense
involved and the limited number of cases that go to trial.108 Instead, a remedy
that is likely more effective for larger numbers of defendants is a change in the
procedures used by the police to obtain identifications. In my judgment, the
simple mechanism of a “double-blind” procedure under which the investigative
officer who conducts the identification does not know the identity of the
suspect will be very important and effective in reducing suggestivity and will
lead to fewer false identifications.109 Innocent individuals are spared the
damage of initial false accusation, and the potential inadequacy of counsel to
105. See Givelber, supra note 103, at 1358.
106. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1380-88 (2007) [hereinafter Mosteller,
The Duke Lacrosse Case] (describing generally the woeful inadequacy of the constitutional protections against
suggestive identifications).
107. See id. at 1410.
108. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012) (acknowledging that our criminal justice system
is one of pleas, not trials).
109. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, supra note 106, at 1388-92.

2012]

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FAIRNESS

15

investigate and try the case becomes irrelevant.110 A double-blind procedure is
relatively simple to administer in many instances, not overly expensive, and
quite easy to explain and defend.111
Unfortunately, success with this type of reform lacks the payoff of a clear
victory. With a double-blind procedure in operation, we may be confident as a
matter of logic that, overall, fewer innocent defendants have been charged and
convicted and more justice has been achieved, but no clear victories can be
documented.112 Again, my emphasis is on what works, not what derives from
constitutional commands. I suggest it may be helpful, however, to identify
these administrative reforms as targeted to secure guarantees fundamental to
our constitutional structure—labeling them as a suite of reforms designed to
help fulfill the Sixth Amendment’s goal of effective assistance of counsel, for
example. In general, I have a preference for reforms that operate simply and
are easy to explain and justify.113 Also, proposals will have more staying power
if they resonate with elementary concepts associated with good government,
one of which is transparency.114
By contrast, creation of new rights or extension of rights that involve
substantial monetary expenses will face significant hurdles and are likely to be
modestly enforced. For example, reforms that depend on providing additional
experts to defendants may be difficult to implement, even if defined as rights,
because of their cost.115 Also, reforms should be preferred that encourage and
achieve compliance rather than principally punish violations through exclusion
110. See id. at 1365-71.
111. See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615, 617
(noting that the double-blind procedure is relatively costless).
112. See Amy Klobuchar & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Protecting the Innocent/Convicting the Guilty:
Hennepin County’s Pilot Project in Blind Sequential Eyewitness Identification, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1,
26 (2005).
113. One of the problems I find with the new confrontation right as described by Crawford as covering
only testimonial statements is that it is not easily explained to the skeptical. Testimonial in what way and for
what purpose? See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359-74 (2004).
114. See David S. Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets?, 18 MICH. TELCOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 61-64
(2011) (noting that transparency is necessary for good government).
115. See David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 74 [hereinafter Sklansky,
Hearsay’s Last Hurrah]. Professor Sklansky has argued for an approach to confrontation rights that is
broader than the simple right to cross-examine, which is particularly important when experts are involved:
In the case of forensic science, meaningful confrontation likely requires a good deal more
than disclosure of the results reached by the prosecution's analysts and their methodology. At a
minimum, defendants probably need access to independent experts, to the underlying databases on
which the state relies, and—where feasible—to samples and materials that will allow them to carry
out their own tests. . . . It may also be that defendants cannot challenge forensic proof effectively
on an individual, case-by-case basis; to make the Confrontation Clause more than an empty
formalism in the increasing number of criminal cases that rely heavily on scientific proof, it may
be necessary to put into place certain systemic protections—for example, regulatory oversight of
forensic labs, and facilitation of information-pooling by defense attorneys.
Id. I find this a very interesting proposal and would only emphasize that parts requiring major outlays of
resources, as in providing additional expert services for the defense, are likely to be unattainable in practice
because of implementation costs, whereas less costly “good government” approaches of greater neutrality,
access, and admissibility of evidence may be more viable albeit perhaps less effective.
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of evidence. I will provide three examples of systems that work the appropriate
way.
A. Provision of Neutral Forensic Investigators and Analysis
The early stages of a criminal investigation are handled by the police, who
frequently are part of the “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”116
Largely that competitiveness will remain, but in many criminal cases a stage
follows where critical pieces of evidence are examined and analyzed by
forensic specialists, and here such competitiveness does not necessarily come
with the task.117 Efficiency and accuracy may be enhanced by facilitating high
quality, neutral investigation from the beginning by a law enforcement-related
investigative and forensic sciences unit. The experience in North Carolina
recently with a blood analysis in the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI)
demonstrates the problems that can result when forensic science is not
neutral.118 Evidence uncovered in an Innocence Commission proceeding and
an unrelated criminal investigation revealed a systemic bias in the SBI that
tested substances suspected to be blood at the crime scene and provided expert
opinions on the significance of blood patterns at the crime scene.119 Evidence
damaging to the prosecution was frequently withheld, and members of the unit
saw their job as to aid the prosecution rather than to provide neutral analysis.120
Some problematic SBI units have been disbanded, and an effort is being made
to demand adherence to high standards of accuracy and neutrality for those
functions performed.121
In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court ruled that under the Due Process
Clause, in a case dependent upon testimony regarding the sanity of the
defendant, the defense had the right of access to an expert, but the Court did not
conclude that access had to be to a defense expert.122 For effective adversarial

116. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
117. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, PostDNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1314-33 (2004) (discussing examinations of evidence by forensic
analysts with no law enforcement involvement).
118. See Joseph Neff, Ex-SBI Agent Deaver’s Testimony Could Lead to Reviews, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Jan. 22, 2012, 10:06 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/01/01/1745785/peterson-case-just-thestart.html.
119. See id. (describing pattern of erroneous results produced by one particular forensic specialist with
the SBI blood analysis unit that led to the exoneration of one man in 2010, the new trial for another in 2011,
and a formal outside review of and the termination of the blood stain pattern unit).
120. See id.
121. Mandy Locke & Joseph Neff, Long Delays in SBI Reforms Stir Its Critics, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Aug. 7, 2011, 4:38 AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/08/07/1396114/long-delays-in-sbi-reformsstir.html.
122. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (“We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates
to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at
a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of
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presentation, providing a defense expert has clear advantages, but a more
neutral expert may be a realistic, second-best solution and perhaps the only one
that is politically and financially feasible.
B. Full Open-File Discovery
A very important reform for improving the defense, and arguably justice,
is full open-file discovery. That reform is linked, in my mind, to curing the
weaknesses of the enforcement of the defendant’s right to receive exculpatory
information from the prosecution under Brady.123 Prosecutors understandably
have difficulty fully complying with Brady because, as part of their ethical
duty, they have reached a conclusion that the defendant is guilty after review of
all the evidence.124 As a result, they are likely to miss the “exculpatory” nature
of evidence that they either did not notice or have already determined is not
truly exculpatory.125 On the other hand, if prosecutors are obligated to provide
all information available to them and to government investigators working on
the case, the failure of the prosecutor neither to be familiar with the information
nor to recognize its exculpatory impact matters.126
Providing full open-file discovery should improve counsel’s performance
in terms of both preparation for trial and effectiveness of cross-examination.
Investigation is one of the components of effective assistance.127 Defense
attorneys have less need to investigate and, if they do, an easier time conducting
the investigation, if the prosecutor’s full file is available.128 Similarly, the
resource imbalance between the prosecution and the defense is in part based on
the support services available to each, with the prosecution benefitting from its
ability to tap police investigative resources.129 Clearly, having a defense
investigator whose task is to find information useful to the defense is different
from, and preferable to, relying on the investigative resources of the
prosecution, but providing the product of those prosecutorial resources to the
defense effectively narrows the resource gap. Similarly, full open-file

course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to
receive funds to hire his own.”).
123. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1963). The “Brady” right, as it is generally known, was
first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland under the Due Process Clause. Id.
124. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2011) (outlining the responsibilities of
the prosecutor).
125. See Christopher Deal, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose and the
Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1803 (2007).
126. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike
Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 306-11 (2008)
[hereinafter Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence].
127. See United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster I), 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (describing the
components of effective assistance to include “appropriate investigations, both factual and legal”).
128. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1558-59 (2010).
129. See id. (noting that open-file discovery would even the playing field).
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discovery will allow counsel to perform more effectively at trial, particularly in
cross-examining and confronting government witnesses.130
Obviously, there is a caveat to providing full open-file discovery. That is,
the potential imbalance it creates to advantage defendants, particularly
defendants who are represented by excellent defense counsel with substantial
funds.131 As a result, provision of full access to the prosecution’s investigative
material requires some reciprocation by the defense in revealing its anticipated
evidence.132 Together with greater neutrality of investigative services, these
changes could result in greater injustice as more guilty defendants, particularly
those with financial resources, are acquitted. The focus here is upon achieving
a larger measure of fairness and accuracy for the typical case where the
defendant is indigent, and in those cases, there is less likelihood of a substantial
imbalance favoring the defense. Nevertheless, measures to achieve greater
fairness will come with adjustments to defense advantages and the need to be
realistic about potential damage to justice.
C. Neutrality by Design of Prosecutorial Investigative and Screening
Functions
Measures should be undertaken to structure the prosecutors’ offices to be
more neutral at the investigative and charging phases. Professor Rachel
Barkow has argued that the modern-day prosecutor essentially functions as
primary adjudicator for most defendants.133 This actual role should be
recognized by separating the investigative function, which conceptually should
be conducted more neutrally, from the trial function, which is inherently
adversarial.134
Similarly, agencies that perform investigative tasks generally should be
organized and operated insofar as possible to approach the task neutrally.
Justice is enhanced and efficiency gained by quality investigation conducted
from the beginning by an agency operating as neutrally as possible rather than
130. See Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 45, 63
(1993) (arguing that “[f]ull pretrial discovery is the key” to challenging through cross-examination expert
testimony under the confrontation right); Andrew Taslitz, Catharsis, the Confrontation Clause, and Expert
Testimony, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 103, 113 (1993) (same).
131. See Medwed, supra note 128, at 1559.
132. See Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, supra note 126, at 273 (describing traditional arguments
against full criminal discovery requirements centered in the fear of defense perjury to counter known
evidence, witness intimidation, and the imbalance given the defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against
required personal disclosures and the response of reformers to require rather broad reciprocal discovery from
the defense).
133. See Barkow, supra note 62, at 876-77.
134. See id. at 901, 913-21 (arguing that U.S. Attorneys Offices should be organized so that separate
lawyers handle investigation and charging functions); see also Mosteller, Failures of the American
Adversarial System, supra note 59, at 339-43 (suggesting that a broadly considered organizational effort to
make an effort at an initial neutral effort and an opportunity for later review by prosecutors who have a
meaningful degree of separation from the direct prosecution of the case can facilitate a fair treatment of
potential claims of innocence).
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by requiring the later provision of a defense-oriented investigator or analyst to
provide a competing perspective.135 Although cooperation between defense
and prosecution is not part of the adversarial model or the Sixth Amendment
guarantee, there may be places where the advantages to the client and the
benefits to the effective administration coincide.136
V. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO COUNSEL BEFORE AND AT TRIAL AND
CONFRONTATION
A. Improving the Operation of the Right to Counsel at Trial
1. Unlikely Doctrinal Reformulation
One way the operation of the right to counsel at trial could have been
improved would have been through the definition of the effective assistance of
counsel. I express this thought in the past tense because this decided issue is
unlikely to be revisited. The approach of Judge David Bazelon in the initial
panel decision in United States v. DeCoster would have provided an alternative
construction of the right to effective assistance of counsel and effectively
buttressed the enforcement of the right to counsel under Gideon.137
Judge Bazelon’s opinion expressed the right to effective assistance in
terms of “reasonably competent assistance,” which was in turn specifically
defined through a series of duties, which he termed the “minimum requirements
of competent performance.”138 That approach was first rejected by the D.C.
Circuit, sitting en banc, which eliminated the mandate of specified duties in
favor of finding ineffectiveness when the performance of counsel fell
“measurably below accepted standards”139 and then laid to rest in the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Strickland v. Washington and United States
v. Cronic.140
Judge Bazelon’s formulation of ineffective assistance of counsel differed
from the Washington approach in two respects. First, it defined duties of
competent counsel in advance of the specific proceeding, whereas the Supreme
Court adopted a more general objective standard of reasonableness judged in
135. Cf. supra note 119 and accompanying text.
136. See Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty, supra note 29, at 270-71. Professor Smith
suggests that in death penalty cases a well-developed defense presentation regarding the strength of the case
for life imprisonment may allow the prosecution to reach a rational decision regarding a negotiated life
sentence before committing to a costly and ultimately unsuccessful death penalty trial that, once announced,
cannot politically be easily reversed. See id.
137. See United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster I), 487 F.2d 1197, 1199-1205 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
138. United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster II), 624 F.2d 196, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting); see DeCoster I, 487 F.2d at 1203-04 (listing obligations such as conferring with the client and
“appropriate investigations”).
139. DeCoster II, 624 F.2d at 215.
140. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 688-89 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
663-64 (1984).
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retrospect in the context of the specific case.141 Second, Judge Bazelon’s
DeCoster approach did not incorporate a requirement of prejudice into the
finding of the violation,142 while Washington requires the defendant to show
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”143
Had something like DeCoster I become the law, not only would
ineffective assistance of counsel law be different today, but the Gideon right to
counsel would have developed differently.144 Specific activities, such as basic
investigation, would have been required as a standard matter to avoid the threat
of reversal on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.145 But, ex ante
performance standards are not currently legal requirements of effective
assistance, and I see no path for such standards to become the law.146
One potential route to something like this would be through an approach
that gives primacy to a discerned core meaning of the right to counsel that
includes a concept of adequacy.147 The originalism route, however, at least as
defined by Justice Scalia, is blocked. Scalia draws a distinction in United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez between the core meaning of the right to counsel and
effective assistance.148 He describes the core meaning of the right to counsel to
historically be the right of one who does not require the appointment of counsel
to have counsel of his or her own choice.149 By contrast, he finds the right to
effective assistance of counsel to be based on the Due Process Clause, rather
than the Sixth Amendment, and derived from the purpose of ensuring a fair
trial.150 That derived right comes with the limitations of its secondary status,
such as the requirement to prove prejudice, which is not part of the core right of
choice of retained counsel.151 Justice Scalia similarly concludes the broader
Gideon right of an indigent to appointment of counsel is not part of the Sixth
Amendment’s core right.152
141. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-90.
142. See Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1, 24-33 (2009) (discussing the general development of the effective assistance of counsel standards
in the circuit courts prior to Washington and the specifics of Judge Bazelon’s DeCoster approach).
143. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
144. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 139-41.
147. See Chhablani, supra note 142, at 37-42 (making an argument for a Sixth Amendment based right to
effective assistance of counsel disentangled from Due Process would be akin to that developed by Judge
Bazelon in DeCoster I).
148. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 147 (2006).
149. See id. at 144, 148-49.
150. Id. at 147.
151. Id. at 147-48.
152. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1495 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Sixth
Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel,
or to use volunteered services of counsel.”). See generally William P. Marshall, Progressive
Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional
Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1264-66 (2011) (describing how the conclusion that appointed counsel is
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Whether the rulings in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye will have
any substantial effect on the actual meaning of effective assistance is practically
unlikely but possible, particularly at a theoretical level. The cases make no
direct theoretical changes in the general meaning of ineffectiveness, but the
opinions suggest several changes in emphasis that may have an indirect impact
on the meaning.153 First, in recognizing the importance of the guilty plea
process, they may bring a focus on the actual practices in what is often a high
volume, low effort part of criminal defense work.154 Supposedly, McMann v.
Richardson has for over forty years required effective assistance when the right
to a jury trial is given up and a guilty plea accepted, but it is hard to find in the
results much attention to the adequacy of counsel’s efforts.155 More recently,
the Court in Padilla v. Kentucky appeared to give some emphasis to the
adequacy of at least one part of the advice before the entry of the guilty plea—
the immediate consequences of that plea in producing the defendant’s
deportation.156 But, that opinion did not suggest the strong potential for a
wholesale re-evaluation of the level of scrutiny given to counsel’s efforts before
a guilty plea was entered.157
Now, the Court reached two conclusions that it explicitly connected in a
causal chain.158 It concluded, as noted earlier, that “ours ‘is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials.’”159 As a result, the adequacy of
counsel’s effort in that plea process must be guaranteed, stating “it is
insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”160
The Court further explained that it is the negotiation of the plea that “is
almost always the critical point for a defendant.”161 “In order . . . [for the
defendant to get the benefits of a plea], criminal defendants require effective
counsel during plea negotiations. ‘Anything less . . . might deny a defendant
effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice
would help him.’”162
A second point that the Court made in Lafler is potentially important to
the future development of the scope of effective assistance of counsel. The
essential to a fair trial, the central argument in Gideon, claims to flow directly from the constitutional
definition but is not originalist).
153. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408-11 (2012).
154. See id. at 1407 (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012)).
155. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985) (ruling that Strickland v. Washington’s two-part test applies to ineffective assistance challenges to
guilty pleas).
156. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
157. Id.
158. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
159. Id. (quoting Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1407-08 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Court rejected the argument that a just result is the only value protected by the
right to counsel.163 The “fairness and regularity of the process that [precede]”
the trial also matter.164 It quoted the language from Kimmelman v. Morrison
that “[t]he constitutional rights of criminal defendants . . . are granted to the
innocent and guilty alike. Consequently, we decline to hold either that the
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or
that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt.”165
These observations by the Court are obviously not new, but they do bring
a sense of the defendant’s right to fair procedure into plea bargaining that more
closely resembles the treatment Justice Scalia gives to core Sixth Amendment
rights than does Strickland v. Washington.166 Scalia complains that the ruling
in Lafler “embraces the sporting-chance theory of criminal law.”167 Whether
this different perspective on plea bargaining will suggest to courts that some
minimal level of investigation and discovery, for example, are always required
before guilty pleas can be properly recommended by counsel is unclear but
possible. If some minimal level of performance were to be required for cases
ending in guilty pleas or in rejected guilty pleas, it is difficult to understand
why some basic level of performance would not be required for cases going to
trial.
2. Improving Assistance of Counsel
Real benefits can be gained through developing better administrative
systems for provision of counsel.168 These changes can help by (1) giving a
measure of independence to counsel;169 (2) putting the most able, available
lawyers to work on the most difficult cases; and (3) taking advantage of
institutional representations in particular types of cases.170 The requirements of
a certain number of years of practice and expertise in the particular area of
practice may not be elements of effective assistance as the United States
163. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986)).
166. See supra note 152.
167. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 55, at 20-23 (listing, after inadequate funding, the structural problems of
the appointment process and independence as among the major reasons for excessive caseloads for public
defenders).
169. See, e.g., Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty, supra note 29, at 265 (noting that in some
counties where many death penalty cases are tried, the judges who control the appointment of counsel may
choose lawyers who are expected not to cause “too many headaches for the judge”).
170. See id. at 260-64 (noting that, for the specialized group of death penalty cases that in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and Los Angeles, California, public defender offices, which may not be particularly effective
overall but have substantial advantages over privately appointed attorneys because those offices can better
identify homicide cases that are likely to be tried as death penalty cases and can do the type of pretrial
mitigation investigation and repeated client visits needed to establish a viable case for life imprisonment, and
to have the relationship required to convince the client to accept a penalty of life without the possibility of
parole).
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Supreme Court sees it, but those characteristics can be built into the criteria for
appointment utilized by an independent administrative structure.171 Greater
attention can also be paid—either by judges handling the trials or by new
administrative agencies that appoint counsel—to ensure that the basic tasks of
an adequate defense have been addressed.172
A second suggestion goes toward realistic arguments to improve funding.
As I recognized earlier, significant improvement in funding levels is unlikely.173
While it is unclear that any approach can overcome the systemic and political
barriers, an approach that is built around rough equity between prosecution and
defense resources may have a marginally better chance of success.174 It also has
some of the persuasive power of a good government argument to support it.175
B. Protecting the Sixth Amendment Right to Assistance of Counsel Pretrial
The limited reach of the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel pretrial against solicitation of incriminating statements from the
defendant by government agents, first articulated under Massiah v. United
States, demonstrates why a broader approach is needed to protect the interests
behind the constitutional rights.176 Under the formalistic doctrine developed by
the Supreme Court, these protections, for example, apply only to the specific
charged offenses pending at the time of the government contact and apply only
if the defendant establishes that the government agent deliberately elicited the
statements.177 As a result, much government contact will not be covered, and

171. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665-66 (1984) (rejecting an approach that judges
ineffective assistance on the basis of “extrinsic” claims about the qualifications or preparation of the attorney
rather than actual adequacy of counsel’s performance at trial).
172. See Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, and Evidence Production Protocols, 45 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 133, 143-49 (2013).
173. See supra Part II.B.
174. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice
Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 251-52 (2004) [hereinafter Wright, Parity of Resources]. I have also argued
for an emphasis on innocence protection. See generally Mosteller, Defense Attorneys, supra note 82 (arguing
that the important role defense attorneys play in protecting innocent defendants who have no clear proof of
their innocence can be an important basis for better funding for the defense function).
175. See Wright, Parity of Resources, supra note 174, at 262. Professors Ron Wright and Don Dripps
have argued for an approach based on rough parity of resources between the prosecution and the defense.
Professor Wright centers the argument in political practicality. See id. at 230-62. Dripps develops his
argument as part of a revised definition of effective assistance. See Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
supra note 61, at 244 (“The better approach would ask before proceedings commence whether the defendant's
lawyer can effectively represent him. Because the effectiveness of counsel is relative to the opposition, the
test should be whether the defendant is represented by a lawyer roughly as good and roughly as well-prepared
as counsel for the prosecution.” (emphasis added)).
176. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
177. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168-72 (2001) (ruling that right to counsel attaches only to
charged offenses with no exception for uncharged crimes that are “factually related” to a charged offense);
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 460 (1986) (ruling that interactions between defendant and informant
placed in his cell did not constitute “deliberate elicitation” of the incriminating comments and therefore
finding no Sixth Amendment violation).
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the defendant may have a difficult time proving that the government agent
actively elicited the challenged statements.178
In general, legislative and administrative rules should be developed to
expand recording, preservation, and disclosure of encounters between the
police and citizens, particularly suspects and defendants, in situations likely to
be involved in criminal justice proceedings. This certainly includes all
conversations between the police and defendants.179
Requirements can be developed in investigative agencies to record broad
ranges of evidence gathering, such as the taking of witness statements and
contacts with suspects, and prosecutors can develop standards that require
protective procedures, such as corroboration and review panels in cases where
guilt is fairly viewed as uncertain and dependent on informant testimony.180
While underfunding of defense services is apparently more acute,
prosecutor offices are cash strapped and more and more are unable to
investigate and evaluate cases extensively.181 This inadequacy may help some
defendants whose cases will be abandoned, but it will likely not help justice or
reveal inadequacies of proof against the innocent. Moreover, as suggested
earlier, prosecutors’ offices should be reorganized to facilitate neutral
evaluation at the investigative and charging stages.182
C. Confrontation
Like many of the other participants in the Symposium, I have interests in
both Evidence and the Criminal Procedure camp. I have a sense that the more a
scholar is focused on Criminal Procedure, the more ambivalence he or she has
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington.183 When
Crawford was decided, as someone who is fully invested in Evidence
scholarship despite also writing in Criminal Procedure, I met the development
with great optimism, but I had some trepidation as well. The trepidation came
for three reasons. First, the right was defined as limited to formalized
testimonial statements; second, it was anchored in the originalism of Justices
Scalia and Thomas; and third, it is difficult to explain, particularly when it is

178. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 460.
179. Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
693, 715-16 (1996) (arguing that all police encounters in which consent may be requested should be recorded
by the police on body-worn recording devices as soon as they approach a susptect).
180. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not Innocents:
Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 519, 519 (2009).
181. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 9, at 5.
182. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
183. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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presented as exclusively a historically oriented procedural right on how
evidence must be presented.184
My reading of the state of hearsay and the developing concept of
confrontation at the time of the framing of the Constitution persuades me that
the testimonial concept gets the story roughly right as long as it is flexibly
interpreted and not given a formalistic cast. We are not at the end of the
Crawford story, but rather in the middle, so a good conclusion is still possible.
However, I have a feeling of disappointment and regret at the failure of
Crawford to meet the expectations I held for a fundamentally new approach to
confrontation. I worry that Crawford has accomplished its single important
victory—that of eliminating admission as a statement against interest of
statements by co-participants in a crime to police officers interrogating them
after their arrest—and that we have already seen the doctrine’s high water mark
in Davis v. Washington,185 where it seemed that the new doctrine would cover
most witness statements given to police officers after the commission of a
crime.186
Formalism and a restrictive definition of testimonial statements are leading
the doctrine to be defined in ways that are not protective of a substantive right
of confrontation based around a goal of testing major categories of hearsay that
was accusatory against the defendant at the time it was made.187 My larger
problems with originalism are outside the scope of this paper, and I note here
only two. Originalism cannot confidently answer most important modern-day
issues at their cutting edge, which is where the Supreme Court decides cases,
and it directs analysis, not to sound policy within the context of historically
based principles, but instead to the rulings in what is usually a small set of
analogous, and often ambiguous, English and American cases of the founding
era.188
184. Id. at 68. The argument for the necessary separation is that when confrontation is seen as derived
from fairness, it becomes a hollow right that is eliminated whenever the evidence appears reliable and
trustworthy and the defendant likely guilty. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
185. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Davis involved two cases. Id. at 817-20. In one, the
Court ruled that a statement made by the victim of a domestic violence assault to a 911 operator during the
course of an assault was not testimonial and therefore not covered by the Confrontation Clause, but in the
other, it held that a statement by another domestic violence victim some period of time after the assault was
concluded to police officers interviewing her in her home was testimonial. Id. at 828, 830. The opinion
appeared to draw a bright line that clearly made testimonial statements made by witnesses to police except
during a crime or its immediate aftermath and gave only minimal attention to the formality requirement. See
generally Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism of the “Testimonial” Statement
Concept, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 429, 433-38 (2007) [hereinafter Mosteller,“Testimonial” Statement Concept]
(describing the decision in two cases and discussing the emerging definition of a modest formality
requirement). Much of the apparent certainty of Davis seemed to be taken back by the Court’s more recent
decision in Michigan v. Bryant. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).
186. Unfortunately, Michigan v. Bryant eliminated much of the clarity of Davis as it extended the scope
of the “ongoing emergency” concept. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158-60.
187. See Mosteller,“Testimonial” Statement Concept, supra note 185, at 433-38.
188. The lack of concern with policy and consequences is not inadvertent by Justice Scalia but part of his
basic view about the proper interpretation of the constitutional text. See Arnold H. Loewy, A Tale of Two
Justices (Scalia and Breyer), 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2011) (noting that “Justice Scalia . . . would
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Justice Scalia explained why a judge’s assessment of trustworthiness or
reliability was immediately irrelevant with a powerful analogy.189 He compared
the procedurally based nature of two rights under the Framers’ design—the
Sixth Amendment’s rights to confrontation and to a jury trial.190 He argued:
“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin
to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not
what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”191 That analogy, however, does not
explain why concerns related to untrustworthiness, such as the accusatory
nature of the statements, are always irrelevant, and I believe the woodenness of
the originalist approach to issues of policy contributes to the begrudging
enforcement of the right by trial judges.192
On the other hand, there is a core truth in Crawford’s relatively narrow
testimonial approach—or something closely resembling it.193 If it were policy
driven with pragmatic elements, which it is not supposed to be, it would rest on
the proposition that a Confrontation Clause that covers too much hearsay will
protect it only weakly or will be riddled with exceptions. As a result, the
Clause must cover only or strictly the most dangerous classes of hearsay.
One of my major reasons that any definition of the Confrontation Clause
right must be robust in its sanction for non-compliance is that frequently
witness unavailability is subject to strategic decisions by the prosecution. In
Ohio v. Roberts, a witness, who was alive and well but not in contact with her
family, was considered by the prosecution unfindable, which the Court
accepted.194 But, as Justice Brennan argued in dissent, if the prosecution had
not possessed a highly incriminating examination of that witness at the
preliminary hearing, they would have been far more motivated to try to find the
witness—efforts that may well have succeeded.195
Obviously, some witnesses, such as those who are deceased, are clearly
unavailable. In many situations, however, such as with child abuse and
domestic violence victims, the unavailability/availability decision is one that is
subject to different outcomes based on the ease of fitting the case into an

allow text to trump everything else, especially consequences[,] . . . [and] if you don't like the consequences,
blame it on the framers’ choice of words”).
189. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-63 (2004).
190. Id. at 62, 69.
191. Id. at 62.
192. See Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, supra note 115, at 74; Jeffery Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and
the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 358-61 (2012). David Sklansky
with fairness and Jeff Bellin with unavailability were each searching for some guiding principle or
supplemental approach to help guide Crawford’s further development or backstop its inadequacies. See
Sklanksy, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, supra note 115, at 74; Bellin, supra, at 358-61. Both approaches, it seems
to me, have promise.
193. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
194. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 76 (1980).
195. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 79-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult to believe that the State
would have been so derelict in attempting to secure the witness' presence at trial had it not had her favorable
preliminary hearing testimony upon which to rely in the event of her ‘unavailability.’”).
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exception and the sanction for failing to produce a potentially available
witness.196 A confrontation right with real teeth at the enforcement end
motivates the prosecution to produce witnesses rather than face the penalty of
exclusion of their statements and results in a higher percentage of witnesses
appearing at trial.197 The firm and harsh remedy, however, is not without its
costs, and overall it gives the defense a benefit without a necessary connection
to greater accuracy.198
An advantage of providing confrontation where the witness is physically
available is that providing the right is not usually very expensive because a trial
is being held with counsel who can conduct physical confrontation and crossexamination.199 A moderately skilled defense attorney can secure at least some
marginally beneficial concessions through cross-examination in most cases.200
Those benefits will be substantially enhanced if the reform advocated earlier of
full open-file discovery is provided.201 With such discovery and its resulting
access to information regarding the prosecution’s witnesses and evidence, the
cross-examination made possible by the confrontation right will likely be much
more complete and effective.202
A distinction generally exists between certain classes of cases, which
highlights one of the difficulties with the Crawford approach for domestic
violence cases.203 When the challenged statement involves a child, children can
generally be produced because they are in the care of an adult who supports the
prosecution, and in many situations, the child, through careful preparation, can
be made comfortable regarding testifying.204 Trauma that can make effective
testimony unavailable is not to be treated lightly, but it is not necessarily
harmful to the well-being of the child.205

196. When I presented this argument at a symposium at Brooklyn Law School in the fall of 2011, a
defense attorney recounted that just after Crawford was decided, a trial judge indicated that she thought the
new doctrine applied to hearsay from unavailable witnesses in two of his pending cases and scheduled a
hearing to rule on the issue. However, before that hearing was held, the prosecution announced that those two
witnesses, who had previously been unfindable, would testify. The attorney concluded that the threat of
exclusion of their testimony had motivated a more diligent effort to locate them.
197. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1355-56 (2005).
198. Id. at 1363.
199. See Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors: The Failure of the Supreme Court’s Accuracy Rationale in
White v. Illinois Requires a New Look at Confrontation, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 145, 178-81 (1993).
200. See Todd E. Pettys, Counsel and Confrontation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 201, 224-25 (2009).
201. See Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, supra note 126, at 318.
202. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
203. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of
Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 518 (2005); Jeanine Percival, The Price of Silence: The Prosecution of
Domestic Violence Cases in Light of Crawford v. Washington, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 215-17 (2005).
204. See John E.B. Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, Cross-Examination,
and Impeachment, 18 PAC. L. J. 801, 805 (1987).
205. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 784-85 (describing research
regarding the limited general effect of trauma to children resulting from testifying).
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In domestic violence cases, some victims can be produced.206 Others,
however, become uncooperative, which can occur for a number of reasons—
most are unrelated to innocence.207 I find no easy or effective solution here.
Proving forfeiture by wrongdoing will not be possible in many situations where
it exists, and the costs of ensuring safety are considerable and of the type I have
generally treated as prohibitive for effective reform.208 On the other hand,
assuming forfeiture by wrongdoing for a whole class of cases would deny
justice to defendants, some of whom are innocent.209 Domestic violence cases
are the Achilles’ heel of Crawford.210 Victims frequently do not appear for
trial, and although that may be because the initial accusation was false, the most
frequent reason likely relates to a combination of intimidation by, and economic
dependence on, the perpetrator.211 Moreover, while the prosecution could
provide protection and assistance to victims and remedy much of these causes
of unavailability, the required resource outlay would be enormous.212 Because
such funds will not be forthcoming, the loss of evidence and justice in domestic
violence cases under Crawford’s operation likely has no clear remedy.
When the prosecution is unable to produce a witness and, as a result, will
lose important evidence under the confrontation right, courts will be tempted to
find ways to limit the costly right.213 That is the situation we often face in
enforcing Crawford, particularly when prosecutors resist its commands.214 I
hope that over time the focus will shift more to finding ways to ensure
confrontation rather than the prosecution fighting its enforcement and scholars
supportive of the right emphasizing the developing additional ways to provide
confrontation rather than the remedy of exclusion.
VI. THE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF FAIRNESS
Fairness has many different meanings, and I highlight only one element of
those differences.215 This element is the conflict between fairness designed to
produce a just result and a guarantee of a fair procedure to all as a value
separate from the impact on accuracy (or innocence). Justice Scalia has a clear
view of the Sixth Amendment that, interestingly, is immediately unrelated to
either accuracy or innocence.216 The right to counsel is about the ability of
206. See Percival, supra note 203, at 241.
207. Id. at 215-16.
208. See Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?, 28 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 301, 307 (2005).
209. See United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 426-27 (E.D. Va. 2002).
210. See Percival, supra note 203, at 238-43.
211. See Robert P. Mosteller, Giles v. California: Avoiding Serious Damage to Crawford’s Limited
Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 683-84 (2009).
212. Id.
213. Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REV. 271, 285 (2006).
214. See id.
215. See David Alan Sklansky, Confrontation and Fairness, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 105 (2013).
216. See supra notes 148, 189.

2012]

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FAIRNESS

29

those with the financial capability to be represented by counsel of their
choice.217 The right to confrontation requires a rather unbending commitment
to confrontation for defendants against whom testimonial statements are
offered.218 Justice Scalia acknowledges that in the judgment of the Framers
these rights ultimately served interests of accuracy, but in their immediate
application, he contends that they cannot be modified or constrained by such
concerns.219 In his view, the rights do not serve goals of effectiveness or
pragmatism either.220 They protect the clearly guilty just as much as the
innocent.221 With respect to the right to counsel for indigents and ineffective
assistance of counsel, he believes those are protections that owe much of their
existence to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and as to these rights, concerns of accuracy and balancing of competing
criminal justice goals do hold sway.222 As a result, he protests what he views as
procedural fairness for its own sake in the Court’s most recent Lafler and Frye
decisions.223
My approach in this paper with regard to the Sixth Amendment has been
to focus on measures that are effective and likely pragmatically obtainable that
in turn serve interests of fairness—particularly accuracy and innocence.224 I
have not cast my proposals as part of a remaking of the constitutional right but
rather have concentrated on alternative procedures and administrative
remedies.225 As a result, I have not suggested any modifications of doctrine that
might undercut protections for rights based exclusively upon demands of
procedural fairness, which may be those most likely to benefit clearly guilty
defendants.
217. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 148-49 (2006).
218. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“Dispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes . . . . The legacy of Roberts in other courts vindicates the
Framers’ wisdom in rejecting a general reliability exception. The framework is so unpredictable that it fails to
provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations. Reliability is an amorphous, if not
entirely subjective, concept.”).
219. Id. at 61 (“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence . . . .”). In
Justice Scalia’s view, neither the right to counsel of one’s choice for those able to retain counsel nor the right
to confrontation are modified to meet the goal of trustworthiness. As he stated in Gonzalez-Lopez, “it does
not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair. What the Government
urges upon us here is what was urged upon us (successfully, at one time . . . [under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980)] with regard to the Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation—a line of reasoning that ‘abstracts
from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right.’” Gonzalez−Lopez, 548 U.S. at 145 (quoting
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Also, harmless error does not apply to
the right to counsel of one’s choice. See id. at 148-51 (finding the error structural, which affects the entire
trial, and therefore finding harmless error inapplicable).
220. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150-52.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 147.
223. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392-95 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410-11
(2012).
224. See discussion supra Parts III-IV.
225. See discussion supra Part IV.
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Nevertheless, as Professor Richard Myers has pointed out to me, the
tendency of my suggestions is to separate accuracy protection, which subsumes
innocence protection but also celebrates convictions of the guilty, from
procedural protections that are part of our commitment to procedural fairness
owed to each person—guilty or innocent—charged with a crime. My proposals
can particularly help those who can prove their innocence and those who are
apparently innocent, and a few may still help the clearly guilty. The latter is
illustrated by the benefit of full open-file discovery to the guilty in manicuring
their defense to avoid inconsistent facts available to the prosecution, which are
made known through discovery.226 One outcome of my suggestions may be to
isolate and weaken the position of rights that are largely or exclusively to
protect dignitary interests and defendants who have little plausible claim of
innocence. In an era of particularly limited resources for defending those
charged with crimes and not of expansion of formally declared rights, some
harm to those without a claim of lack of accuracy or innocence may be almost
inevitable. Hopefully, there will be larger benefits through more effective and
achievable procedures that will outweigh the losses.
In my judgment, the most fundamental right to the interests of defendants
in the Sixth Amendment, and indeed in the Bill of Rights, is the right to counsel
and, of course, effective counsel. Resource limitations have made enjoyment of
that right unattainable for a large number of criminal defendants. The recent
decisions of Lafler and Frye regarding the right to counsel in guilty pleas may
reshape part of the process, but I suspect that other than changing slightly the
allocation of resources for defense counsel, after systemic adjustments are
made, the opinions will have no impact on the allocation of state and local
governments funds to indigent defense, which courts have had little long-term
ability to affect.227
VII. CONCLUSION
One function of a keynote is to link together themes of a conference or
symposium. In attempting to satisfy that goal, the task taught me a lesson, and I
hope that this Article has conveyed that important point. The lesson I learned
in trying to link these parts of the Sixth Amendment is that they are linked in a
concept of fairness. Moreover, in trying to protect and extend the functions and
interests that lie behind these rights, a systemic view is warranted and helpful.
In a time in which it is painfully obvious that we have limited resources
available to meet the goals of government and arguably a reticence to extend
legal doctrines, those interested in progressive reform should look beyond
commands based on developing new legal doctrine. The interests of fairness
can be furthered by administrative mechanisms and aided by actors in the
226.
227.
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system beyond defense attorneys and their experts and agents. The victories
may not be the stirring ones of the Warren Court era or draw public note, but
for the individuals not prosecuted or incarcerated erroneously, they can be
extraordinarily significant and fulfill the basic promise of Sixth Amendment
fairness.228
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